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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND THE DURHAM RULE
FRED L. LIEB
Two recent cases in the federal courts have
reached the conclusion that it is unconstitutional to
1
punish a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness.
These decisions employed the rationale of Robinson
v. California,2 which held that it is cruel and unusual to'punish one for being addicted to narcotics,
since narcotics addiction is an illness. In the public
drunkenness cases, which extended the Robinson
doctrine to include acts symptomnatic of an illness,
it was held unconstitutional to punish as a criminal
one who was intoxicated in public, since this act
3
is a symptom of chronic alcoholism. The courts did
not determine whether this prohibition would extend to more active crimes.
In earlier cases other courts had refused to accept a defense based upon an extension of Robinson
to charges involving the uswe and possession of narcotics. Similarly, the courts in the previous public
drunkenness cases had limited their decisions to
the statuts of intoxication.
The courts have not considered one of the logical
implications of these decisions. The argument that
one cannot be punished for a symptom of an illness
is similar to the rationale of the Durham rule, that
one cannot be punished for an act which is the
I Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966);
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir.

1966).

2370 U.S. 660 (1962).
3 Driver

v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).

4
product of an illness, mental or physical. Thus the
drunkenness
public
the
whether
question arises
cases logically compel the Durham rule? In other
words, is the Durham rule a constitutional imperative, required by the Eighth Amendment, or is it
merely one of many tests of crimnal responsibility
from which each state is free to choose?
The Doctrine of Robinson v. California.The first
case to explore the relation between criminal responsibility and the Eighth Amendment was
Robinson v. California.5 The defendant in this case
was convicted under a California statute which
made it a misdemeanor "to be under the influence
of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics", except
when the narcotics have been administered by a
person licensed by the state. 6 The trial judge instructed the jury that the defendant could be
convicted under a general verdict if it were found
that he was an addict, a status offense, or that he
7
had committed the act proscribed by the statute.
Thus, the California court construed its own
statute to mean that a person could be convicted
merely if his condition or status were that of a
narcotic addict.
On the basis of this statutory interpretation, the
4

This rule was formulated in the case of Durham v.
United States 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
- Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
6 CAL.HEAL TH AND SAFETY CODE, § 11721.
7 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 663 (1962).
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Supreme Court considered the problem of punishing a person for the condition or status of addiction.
The Court first stated that narcotic addiction is
generally recognized to be an illness which may be
contracted voluntarily or involuntarily. 8 The
Court further stated that a law which makes a
disease a criminal offense is an infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 9 Thus, the Court
held that a state law which imprisons a person for
such a disease, without any showing of use or possession of a drug, violates the Constitution."
The Court in Robinson was concerned only with
status or passive crimes. It did not extend the constitutional ban to other acts associated with the
illness, such as use and possession of narcotics. The
Court stated that it is within the police power of
the state to regulate narcotics traffic. It could do
this by imposing criminal sanctions against unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, and possession within its borders. The
Court, however, did not expressly state that the
ban of the Eighth Amendment applied only to
punishment for the condition of the illness. Mr.
Justice White, recognizing this in his dissent,
stated that if the Court is correct in saying that it
is cruel and unusual to punish for addiction then
"it is difficult to understand why it would be any
less offensive ... to convict him for use on the same
evidence of use which proved he was an addict." n
He went on to say that it is significant that when
the majority reaffirmed the power of the states to
8Id. at 667.
9Id. at 666. It has been suggested that this is the
first time that the Eighth Amendment was applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Neibel, Implicationsof Robinson v. California, 1 Hous-

L. Rxv. 1 (1963).
However, the case of Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459 (1947), held that the Fourteenth Amendment
would prohibit by its due process clause execution by a
state in a cruel and unusual manner. See also In Re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446.
10Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
The court is not saying that a state cannot have a law
prohibiting narcotic addiction but instead that one
cannot receive a criminal sentence for contravention
of the law. In In Re De La 0, 378 P. 2d 793, a California case heard shortly after Robinson the defendant
was convicted of the use of narcotics, but instead of
receiving penal sanctions he was confined to a rehabilitation center pursuant to a state statute. The
defendant claimed that this was cruel and unusual
punishment according to Robinson. The court held
that Robinson did not support the contention but
instead it affirmed the state's power to establish
compulsory treatment and civil committment for
addicts.
' Id. at 648.
TON
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deal with narcotics traffic, it did not include the
power to punish for use. Thus it might be assumed
that the Court recognized the further implications
of its opinion."
The lower courts have been reluctant to extend
the doctrine of Robinson to use and possession
cases, generally maintaining that this is a matter
for the Supreme Court to decide. In Castle v. United
States,13 the defendant was convicted of purchasing
drugs without a tax stamp and of facilitating the
concealment and sale of drugs. He contended that
since Robinson prohibits the imposition of criminal
penalties upon an addict, it also prohibits a conviction and sentence for the purchase, possession and
concealment by an addict of his daily dosage. The
District of Columbia Circuit, upholding the conviction, felt that the argument "although neither
remote nor insubstantial, is one which, in the light
of the great weight of cases which have imposed
such punishment, is more properly made to the
Supreme Court." 14 The Supreme Court, however,
denied certiorari.
A similar conclusion was reached in Hutcherson v.
United StatesI5 The defendant in that case was convicted of the possession of narcotics. He claimed
that there was no meaningful difference between
punishment for being an addict and the punishment of an addict for possessing drugs he is compelled to crave, and thus the doctrine of Robinson
would apply. The court rejected the argument and
upheld the conviction. Judge Bazelon, concurring
in part and dissenting in part, stated that even
though the Supreme Court did not bar punishment
for possession and use of drugs, this could not be
taken as an approval of punishing those not responsible for their conduct. Thus, he said, Robinson requires serious consideration of the problem
of an addict's responsibility for his conduct. He
went on to state that this could not be considered
in the present case since no evidence was offered
to show that possession was compelled by addic6
tion.
12 Mr. Justice White's statement that the majority
did not affirm the state's power to punish for use is
questionable. It is true that at one point use was not
included. However, the court quoted with approval
Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921), which
states that the states have the power to regulate the
"administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous
and habit-forming drugs."
13347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 929 (1965).
1Id. at 495.
1 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
16
id. at 977-78.
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There is some authority that narcotics addiction
is evidence of mental illness. 17 Many such defendants have pleaded mental impairment under the
Durham rulej 8 These cases do not bear directly on
the issue involved here, but they show that the
courts recognize a connection between narcotics
addiction and the compulsion to use and possess
drugs. It has been recognized by the courts that an
overwhelming craving for drugs can seriously impair control of one's actions, resulting in an irresistible need to obtain narcotics, and that long
addiction affects mental and emotional processes
as well as behavioral controls.' 9 Thus, although the
courts have refused to extend Robinson to acts
merely associated with addiction, they implicitly
recognize that these acts may be an involuntary
result of that illness.
Recent decisions by the federal courts have considered this problem further in relation to chronic
alcoholism rather than drug addiction. Sweeny v.
United States,2" first recognized the lack of responsibility of a chronic alcoholic for the act of drinking.
In that case the defendant was sentenced to five
years imprisonment for violation of the Dyer act
and was subsequently put on probation on the
condition that he refrain from using alcoholic beverages. This condition was violated and the probation revoked. The court held this to be
unreasonable since it was shown that the
defendant's alcoholism destroyed his power of
volition and prevented his compliance with the
condition.
The first case which relied upon Robinson for
reversal of a conviction of public drunkenness was
Driver v. Hinnant.2 The defendant, Driver, was
convicted of violating a North Carolina statute
making it a misdemeanor to appear in public in an
intoxicated conditionYn The Fourth Circuit determined that Driver was a chronic alcoholic. At the
age of fifty-nine, he had been convicted of public
drunkenness more than two hundred times and
17See Horton v. United States, 317 F.2d 595 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Brown v. United States, 331 F.2d 822
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
"8See Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). Hightower v. United States, 325 F.2d 43
(D.C. Cir. 1963). See also Bowman, Narcotic Addiction
and Criminal Responsibility Under Durham, 53 GEo.
L. J. 1017 (1965).
"9See dissent in Hightower v. United States, 325
F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1963); dissent in Heard v. United
States, 348 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
0353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1966).
2356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
1" N. C. GEN. STAT. ch. 14, § 335 (1965).

had spent nearly two thirds of his life in jail for
this offense. The defense was based on the contention that it is cruel and unusual, under the Robinson case, to punish a person for public drunkenness
since it is a symptom of the disease of alcoholism.
The court accepted this argument and ordered
Driver's release.n
The court in Driver noted that it is almost universally accepted that chronic alcoholism is a
disease. The symptoms of this disease appear as a
disorder of behavior, which includes appearance in
public, "unwilled and ungoverned by the victim".
To imprison someone for this would be cruel and
unusual punishment and would violate the Eighth
Amendment.24 However, this finding applies only
to involuntary drunkenness and to acts which are
"compulsive as symptomatic of the disease". With
respect to acts caused by voluntary drunkenness,
and to those acts not characteristic of chronic alcoholism, the offender would be judged as any other
person. 5
The court in this case felt that its decision was
logically compelled by the Robinson decision which,
it stated, makes the North Carolina law inapplicable to one in the circumstances of Driver. All of the
opinions in Robinson, majority as well as concurring and dissenting, had recognized that such a
statute should not be enforced to punish someone
for his involuntary actions.2
The Driver case was used as the basis for a similar
decision in Easter v. District of Columbia. 7 The
District of Columbia Court reversed a conviction
for public drunkenness holding chronic alcoholism
to be a defense." The court, without initially
relying on Robinson, was able to base its reversal
on the District statute. It stated that Congress
intended to set up a program of rehabilitation of
chronic alcoholics providing civil commitment for
29
these individuals rather than criminal sanctions.
The statute defines a chronic alcoholic as a "person
who chronically and habitually uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that he has lost the power of
self-control with respect to the use of such bever"3Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 762 (4th Cir.
1966). The court released Driver rather than institutionalize him probably since there was no North Carolina
Statute authorizing it to do so as there was in the
District of Columbia Statute involved in the Easter
case.
21Id.at 764.
25Id. at 764.
26Id. at 765.

v361 F.2d 50, (D.C. Cir. 1966).
2Id. at 51.
29D. C. CODE, title 24, ch. 5 §501 (1961).
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ages". 30 Thus Congress recognized that the chronic
alcoholic has no power over his condition of drunkenness and should not be held criminally responsible. 31
The court also quoted extensively from Driver2
and implied its approval of this decision by stating
that Easter's conviction could be reversed on the
basis of this case, regardless of the intent of the
civil statute.P The court concluded, following
Driver and Sweeny v. United States,34 "that public
intoxication of a chronic alcoholic lacks the essential element of criminality; and to convict such a
person of that crime would also offend the Eighth
Amendment." 35
Neither Easter nor Driver was heard by the
Supreme Court. An opportunity to consider the
problem was passed when the Court denied certio6
rari in Budd v. California."
There was, however, a
strong dissent from the denial by Mr. Justice
Fortas. He stated that there was evidence that the
defendant suffered from an illness which resulted
in inability to control drinking and other aspects of
his behavior. Justice Fortas argued that it was time
for the Court to decide whether a person suffering
from the illness of alcoholism and exhibiting its
symptoms or effects may be punished criminally
and whether the constitutional proscription of
Robinson makes it cruel and unusual to punish a
chronic alcoholic for his involuntary act.37 Thereafter, the Court apparently accepted the Fortas
argument, for it granted certiorari in a similar case
which will be heard this year.8
If the principle of Robinson is extended to the
public drunkenness of a chronic alcoholic, it would
seem logical to extend it to other involuntary acts
resulting from drug addiction. It is generally recognized that a narcotic addict has no power over
the use and concommitant possession of narcotics. 39
30D. C. CODE, title 24, ch. 5 §502 (1961).
31361 F.2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1966).'
2 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
-8353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965).
35361 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Emphasis added.)
31385 U.S. 909 (1966).
3
7Id.
38Powell v. Texas, 389 U.S. 810 (1967). The court
granted certiorari to determine whether the conviction
of a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness violates
the Eighth Amendment.
39See Bowman, supra note 18. See also the dissent
in Hightower v. United States, 325 F.2d 616 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) which speaks of a compulsive need for
narcotics, and Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 442
(D.C. Cir. 1965), which discusses duress or compulsion
to consume drugs.
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Use and possession can therefore be said to be
symptomatic of the illness of narcotic addiction,
and thus criminal convictions of these acts would
be unconstitutional under Robinson, Driver, and
Easier.
So far we have been concerned only with acts
closely related to the illness-such as use and possession with respect to narcotics, and public intoxication with respect to alcoholism. It may be possible, at least theoretically, to extend the Eighth
Amendment ban even further to cover acts such as
larceny or homicide. The court in Driver confined
its exemption of chronic alcoholics from prosecution to those acts "which are compulsive, as symptomatic of the disease". With respect to behavior
not symptomatic of the disease, the offender
"would be judged as would any person not so
afflicted". 40 However, the court did not state what
other actions it would consider to be symptomatic
of the disease.
The court in Easier similarly applied its decision
to the case at hand. Judge Danaher stated in his
concurring opinion that when Congress passed
the statute involved in the case it "had no thought
whatever of addressing itself to some revised
standards for determining criminal responsibility
as to yet other crimes than public drunkeness."
He went on to say that it was his "complete
understanding that the court is not now doing
SO." 41

Thus it appears that the Robinson doctrine has
had a very limited application. In only two cases
has it been accepted as a ground for exculpability
-narcotic addiction, a status offense, and public
drunkenness, which is not much more than a
status offense. Although judges and writers have
recognized that more active crimes may also be
compelled by addiction or alcoholism courts have
refused to take this significant step without some
direction from the Supreme Court. 2 Perhaps
40Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir.
1966).
41Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 61
(D.C. Cir. 1966). Despite the courts' reluctance to
extend Robinson to more active crimes, there has been
some recognition of the fact that stealing to support
a drug habit may be a symptom of chronic addiction.
Some evidence has been given which tends to show
that continued use of narcotics affects the mind in such
a way that stealing to support the habit becomes
compulsory rather than merely functional. See Bowman,
supra note 18 and the dissent in Hightower v. United
States, 325 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
4 See Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) and Hutcherson v. United States, 345
F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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when the Court hears Powell v. Texas" this term,
some new light will be shed upon this subject.
The Eighth Amendment and the Durham Rule.
While the courts are limited by the fact situations
which are presented to them, the critic is free to
consider what legal implications a certain decision
may have. The implications which arise from the
Driver and Easter decisions are more far-reaching
than the courts seem to recognize. One who is
familiar with the area of criminal responsibility
will, upon reading the rule enunciated in the
Driver case, recognize its similarity to Durham
rule. The Durham rule, set forth is Durham v.
United States", holds that if an act is the product
of a mental illness or defect, the perpetrator of
that act is relieved of criminal responsibility. If
it is cruel and unusual to punish an individual
for an act which is a symptom of an illness, as
Driver states, would it not also be unconstitutional
to punish an individual for an act which is the
product of an illness? In other words, does not the
Eighth Amendment make the Durham rule a
constitutional imperative?
If the terms symptom and product are synonymous, then the answer to the above question must
be in the affirmative. The problem is, however,
that both these terms have been very difficult to
define. The Driver case incorporates various
phrases and arguments, but never succinctly states
what it means by the term symptom. The court
first states that the act must be characteristic
of the disease. 45 This would have been sufficient
46
since it is in accord with the medical definition.
However, the court goes on to consider the term
in a broader sense, speaking of lack of volition and
compulsion to perform certain acts. 47 This is
unfortunate since it is confusing and incompatible
with previous decisions which refused to base
exculpability upon these factors alone.4
The court also considers the element of intent
stating that "the conduct was neither actuated
by evil intent nor accompanied with a consciousness of wrongdoing." 49 Again the court is confusing
-389 U.S. 810 (1967).
44214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
45 356 F.2d, 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
40 Steadman's Medical Dictionary, 1456 (29th ed.
1961), defines symptom as "any departure from normal
functions or appearance which is indicative of disease."
47356 F.2d. 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
4See Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Hightower v. United States, 325 F.2d 616
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
49356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).

and contradictory. Intoxication has sometimes
been said to negate specific intent and thus it
would be a defense for a crime requiring that
element.50 However, since the court recognizes
that the statute in Driver is designed to protect
the public safety, it is malum prohibitum, and thus
there would be no specific intent requirement.6 '
The court's eclecticism seems to result from
its attempt to use as many arguments as possible
to support its rationale that a chronic alcoholic is
a sick person and should be hospitalized rather
than treated as a criminal. The court in Easter
achieved the same result as Driver by statutory
interpretation and it may be unfortunate that it
went on to use Driver as an alternate basis for
exculpability. North Carolina, however, did not
have a statute like that of the District of Columbia
and thus the court had to rely upon another
rationale for releasing the defendant. It might
possibly have given more consideration to the
intent argument. If the jurisdiction in which the
act was committed considered public drunkenness
malum in se it could be said that the defendant's
condition negated any specific intent. If the act is
malum prohibitum, the purpose of a law prohibiting
public drunkenness is carried out merely by removing the alcoholic from the streets. Civil commitment would accomplish this as well as imprisonment and would be more advantageous to society
in the long run.
judge Murtaugh suggests other alternative
arguments for the protection of chronic alcoholics
from imprisonment. He considers public drunkenness to be a status offense and thus it would come
within the Robinson ruling." It is true that the
60See People v. Guillet 342 Mich. 1 (1955), and
ILLrmoIs CM3Ur CODE, 6-3, [ILr.Rnv. STAT. ch. 38
(1964).
51
Criminal law sometimes distinguishes between acts
which are malum in se and malum prohibitun. The
former are acts which are thought to be inherently
wrong in any society. Such acts as homicide and larceny
and other crimes against the person or property are
considered malum in se. Crimes of this nature require
a meis rea or evil intent, and thus lack of a specific intent to comit the crime is a defense. However, some laws
have been promulgated which are designed to prohibit
cetain acts which are basically non-criminal. Laws such
as zoning ordinances and traffic rules are merely regulatory and are for the purpose of administration and
public safety. Intent is not a requisite for a violation of
this type of law and thus lack of intent cannot be used
as a defense.
12Murtaugh, Arrest for Public Intoxication, FoRD.
L. REv. 1, 11 (1966). Some actions have been made
criminal by virute of the fact that they occurred in a
certain place. The MuNicn'An CODE OF CICAGO, ch.
193, considers it disorderly conduct merely to appear in
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offense involves more than the mere condition of
intoxication, but the only additional element is
that the individual is in this condition in public
rather than in private. The place where a status
offence is committed should not operate to transform it into an active crime. Judge Murtaugh also
suggests that the court could have interpreted the
statute as having been intended to proscribe public
drunkenness only as it actually interferes with
public peace and tranquility. Thus vagrants and
derelicts who have merely appeared in public in
an intoxicated condition, would not be subject to
the same treatment as ordinary criminals.u
Regardless of the alternative methods for deciding Drivercase and the unclear meaning of the term
symptom, the court did reach the conclusion that
one cannot be punished for a symptom of a disease.
Thus it must be determined whether the Durham
rule has been interpreted in such a manner as to
be compatible with the logical import of the
Driver decision. In Carter v. United States," it
was stated that the Durham rule means that the
accused would not have committed the act if he
had not been diseased. There must be a "critical
relationship" by which the court means, "decisive,
determinative [and] causal". The court here uses
a "but for" test rather than the more conservative
view which the courts seem to have taken in
Driverand Easter.
Applying this test to chronic alcoholism extends
the Driver decision beyond the scope which the
court intended it to reach. It has been shown that
a substantial proportion of crimes are committed
by persons under the influence of alcohol. 5
Alcohol tends to decrease co-ordination, lowers
inhibition of learned restrictions, and reduces
self-criticism and control." Thus it may be said
that there is a causal relationship between drunkenness and the commission of crimes. The best
example of this is drunken driving-but for the
individual's alcoholic state the act could obviously
not have occurred. If the Driver rule were as broad
gambling houses or houses of prostitution, and to collect
and loiter in certain areas. Many states have similar
statutes in regard to disorderly conduct and vargancy.
However, not only do the public drunkenness statutes
make it a crime to appear in a public place in an intoxicated condition but as Judge Murtaugh suggests,
they seem to transform an individual's status into an
illegal action.
Murtaugh, supra note 52 at 6.

251 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
5 See Baron, Alcohwl, Alcoiwlism, and Crime, 9 CRIM
AND DELIN. 1 (1963) and McGeorge, Alcohol and Crime,
3 MED.
SCI. AN L. 27 (1963).
56

Id.
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as the Durham rule chronic alcoholism would be a
defense to crimes much more active and violent
than public drunkenness. However, as seen from
this discussion, the court did not intend to extend
the defense this far.
The Durham case may be inconsistent with the
decision in Driver in other ways. The decision in
that case was designed to avoid the simplistic
reasoning of the M'Naghten rule! 7 The court
stated that the inability to distinguish between
right and wrong is only one possible symptom of
mental disease. 8 It stated that the fundamental
objection to the right-wrong test is "that it is
made to rest upon any particular symptom". 51
The court recognized that there are many symptoms and circumstances which combine to cause
crime and that the previous tests for mental
competency have failed to recognize the complex
nature of the psychic process.
The rationale of the Driver case is as simplistic
as the M'Naghten rule when considered in light of
our present knowledge of the problems of alcoholism. Judge Murtaugh points out that only a
small portion of the pathological drinkers in the
United States are what medical science calls
chronic or addicted alcoholics.60 The majority
of them, whether corporation executives or skid
row derelicts, drink to escape the problems of
their existence. The drinking is involuntary, but
not compulsive, and results from undersocialization
and inability to cope with one's life. 6' Another
writer has suggested that many alcoholics are
mentally ill and that drunkenness brings out their
psycopathology in an aggressive, sexual or criminal
manner, once their inhibitions have dissolved.2 It
has been stated that even in the types of crimes
most often connected with the use of alcohol,
intoxication is "unquestionably only one of many
causative agents".6 Thus is appears that a simple
cause and effect relationship does not exist between
alcoholism and antisocial behavior as Driver seems
to indicate.
It can be seen then, that Driver and Durham
17 The M'Naghten rule was formulated in Daniel
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200 (1843). Under this
rule a person is not guilty of a criminal act if he does not
understand the nature or quality of his actions or if he
does not know that what he did was wrong. It is commonly called the "right-wrong" test.
214 F.2d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
59Id. at 872.
60
61

Murtaugh, supranote 52 at 10.
d.

Selzer, Alcoholism and the Law, 56 MicH. L. REv.
237 (1957).
62

6 Baron, supra note 55 at 9.
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are inconsistent in many respects. However, an
argument can be made that when the underlying
rationale of the Eighth Amendment ban against
cruel and unusual punishment is considered, the
Durham rule is required by the Constitution,
regardless of these inconsistencies. The decision in
Robinson is based upon the notion that a person
once addicted cannot be held responsible for his
continuing status of addiction. Even the dissent
recognizes that a chronic addict is not responsible
for his condition." The court in Driver states that
the act of public drunkenness "was neither actuated by evil intent nor accompanied with a consciousness of wrongdoing, indispensible ingredients
of a crime." 65 It seems, therefore, that the reason
it is cruel and unusual to make an illness a crime
is because there is no culpability. As the court in
Easter says, "the public intoxication of a chronic
alcoholic lacks the essential element of criminality,
and to convict such a person would offend the
Eighth Amendment." 11 This reasoning is not
confined to alcoholism or drug addiction, but
would seem to apply to any illness, whether mental
or physical. Mr. Justice Fortas has stated that we
do not punish for involuntary conduct, whether
lack of volition results from insanity, addiction to
67
narcotics, or any other illness.
Alcoholism as a Defense. What relevance does
this theoretical discussion have for the chronic
alcoholic? It can be seen from the discussion above
that the complexities of his disease are only now
beginning to be understood by the courts. As
Judge Murtaugh has pointed out, the courts' approach is still somewhat naive and simplistic.s
However, Driver and Easter, have shown that
courts and legislatures are concerned with the
problems of alcoholism and are attempting to solve
them.
One of the legislative approaches can be seen in
the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961. Section 6-3 sets
out the defenses which might be used by an alcoholic. Intoxication is a defense if it
(a) negatives the existence of a mental state
which is an element of the offense; or
(b) is involuntarily produced and deprives
[the individual] of substantial capacity either
4See Mr. Judice Clark's dissent in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
65Driver v. Hinnant 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir.
1966).
66Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
67See dissent to denial of writ of certiorari in Budd v.
California, 385 U.S. 909 (1966).
CSSee Murtaugh, supranote 52.

to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the require9
ments of the law.'
Subsection (a) is the traditional defense of intoxication. It is available to the chronic alcoholic and to
the average person as well but is only applicable
to crimes which require proof of a iens rea, or
criminal intent. For crimes both with and without
this requirement, the non-alcoholic may use subsection (b) since involuntary intoxication may be
produced through fraud or duress. He could not
use the Driver defense, however since this is
specifically limited to chronic alcoholics.
What of the alcoholic? He can rely upon subsection (a) as can the normal person. He can also
rely upon subsection (b) since Driver and Easter
have pointed out that intoxication is involuntary
on the part of the chronic alcoholic. The Driver
defense is also available but it appears to be
currently limited to the case of public drunkenness.
Thus it appears that the Illinois legislature has
already recognized that the traditional defense of
intoxication needed extension. However, the
manner in which this was done must be questioned.
Why is the subsection (b) defense only available
when the intoxication is involuntarily produced?
Why is this subsection worded in the same manner
as the defense for insanity as set forth in section
6-2? Unfortunately the Committee Comments do
not shed any light upon the question. First of all
it is stated that the new law does not substantially
change the old one. This statement is not correct
since the old law only considered drunkenness to
be a defense when it was produced by fraud,
contrivance, or force. Secondly, the Comments
only discuss subsection (a) and do not even consider the other provision."
Perhaps the reason for the legislative classification and wording is the recognition that some
relationship exists between alcoholism and mental
illness. Although the legislature was probably not
aware of the complex psychological problems of
alcoholism, there seems to be an implied recognition that it must be viewed in terms similar to
that of insanity. This may explain the similarity
in wording between section 6-2 and section 6-3.
It may also explain why subsection (b) was limited
to involuntary intoxication. This subsection
actually serves two purposes. It preserved the
defense of the old law when intoxication was in69Illinois Criminal Code, §6-3, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38
(1964).
70 See §6-3, Smith-Hurd Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 (1964).

